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MERIT SELECTION: DOES IT MEET THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN OHIO?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The .question of how judges of Ohio's Supreme and appellate
courts should be selected has become a volatile topic for debate. At
present, Ohio's judicial selection is composed of partisan primary elections and nonpartisan general elections.' Recently, however, in an effort
to improve judicial selection an alternative method has gained support.
The alternative is a nonpartisan merit selection plan proposed as an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution.' The plan, like most institutional
I. The Ohio Constitution provides that the electors of the state at large elect all justices of
the Ohio Supreme Court, and the judges of the courts of appeals shall be elected by the electors of
their respective appellate districts. OHIO CONST. art. IV, §§ 6(A)(l)-(2). With regard to nominating persons as candidates for election to judicial office, the Ohio Revised Code provides that the
Board of Elections shall distribute separate primary election ballots to each political party having
candidates in a primary judicial election. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.13 (Anderson Supp.
1986). In fact, to a certain extent, candidates in partisan primary judicial elections are permitted
to "politick". See Baum, The Electoral Fates of Incumbent Judges in the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas, 66 JUDICATURE 420, 423 (1983) (concise description of Ohio's unique method of judicial
selection-partisan primaries and nonpartisan general elections). With regard to a judicial election, however, the Ohio Revised Code provides that candidates for election must have their names
printed on a nonpartisan ballot. The Code section pertinent to nonpartisan judicial elections reads:
Such ballots shall have printed across the top and below the stubs "Official Nonpartisan Ballot"....
No name or designation of any political party nor any words, designations, or emblems
descriptive of a candidate or his political affiliation, or indicative of the method by which
such candidate was nominated or certified, shall be printed under or after any nonpartisan
candidate's name which is printed on the ballot.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.04 (Anderson Supp. 1986).
2. The proposed amendment, introduced by Senator Paul Pfeifer as S.J. Res. 23, is a variation of the nonpartisan merit selection plan. The amendment, in pertinent part, provides:
Section 6. (A) (I) The chief justice and the justices of the supreme court AND THE
JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF APPEALS SHALL SERVE for terms of six years.
(2) The GOVERNOR SHALL APPOINT, AND FILL VACANCIES IN THE OFFICES OF, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, THE JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT, THE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ....
THE
GOVERNOR SHALL APPOINT AND FILL VACANCIES IN SUCH OFFICES,
UNDER AN APPOINTIVE-ELECTIVE SYSTEM BY SELECTING AN INDIVIDUAL FROM A LIST OF THREE OR MORE QUALIFIED PERSONS WHO ARE
ADMITTED TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THIS STATE AND WHOSE
NAMES ARE PROVIDED TO THE GOVERNOR BY A JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSION ....
(3) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHALL FIX BY LAW THE NUMBER AND
ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS, AND THE
NUMBER, METHOD OF SELECTION, QUALIFICATIONS
.... AND TERMS OF
OFFICE FOR THE MEMBERS OF EACH COMMISSION. . . . AT LEAST ONEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF EACH COMMISSION SHALL BE MEMBERS OF
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improvement proposals, allegedly borrows and profits from the past,
meets the needs of the present, and remains flexible for future development.3 The desired result of this reform is an improved judiciary. The
purpose of this comment is to determine whether or not an improved
judiciary will result. To make that determination, this comment examines empirical evidence and anticipates the likely consequences of the
implementation of merit selection in Ohio.
To this end, the comment begins with a brief overview of both the
current method of judicial selection and the proposed merit selection
system. The focus then shifts to the proposed merit selection system by
evaluating its impact on both democratic accountability and judicial
independence. Next, the analysis evaluates the present hybrid system's
impact on both democratic accountability and judicial independence
Finally, there is a brief discussion of the factors that may help in evaluating the quality of a judge.
II. BACKGROUND
The method of judicial selection in Ohio is once again a topic for
debate. For the third time, there is a proposed amendment to the Ohio
Constitution calling for merit selection of Ohio Supreme Court and appellate court judges. 4 Although previous efforts to amend the constituTHE SAME POLITICAL PARTY.
(4) (a).. . A JUDGE... MAY FILE A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY TO
SUCCEED HIMSELF.
IF A JUSTICE OR JUDGE DOES NOT FILE A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY ... THERE SHALL BE A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE JUSTICE'S OR JUDGE'S TERM OF OFFICE.
(b) . .. THE QUESTION OF THE JUSTICE'S OR JUDGE'S CONTINUANCE
IN OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE ELECTORS
AT THE GENERAL ELECTION....
IF FIFTY-FIVE PER CENT OF THE ELECTORS VOTING ON THE QUESTION VOTE "YES," THE JUSTICE OR JUDGE SHALL BE CONTINUED IN OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM .... IF . . . NOT . . . THERE SHALL BE A VACANCY IN THE OFFICE UPON THE EXPIRATION OF THE TERM.
(c) . . . THE COMMISSION SHALL RATE THE JUSTICE OR JUDGE AS
"WELL QUALIFIED," "QUALIFIED," OR "NOT QUALIFIED" FOR RETENTION
IN OFFICE, AND INFORM THE JUSTICE OR JUDGE, IN WRITING, OF THE
ON THE
PARTICULAR RATING ... THIS RATING SHALL APPEAR, ...
BALLOT....
[(6)] (B) (I)... A SUCCESSOR JUSTICE OR JUDGE SHALL SERVE IN OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM ....
S.J. Res. 23, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess., (1985-1986).
3. A. ASHMAN, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 2
(1974).
4. The most recent effort was in 1979. See Riley, State Bar Launches a Merit Selection
Campaign in Ohio, Nat'l L.J., June 30, 1986, at 7, col. I. Yet the Ohio electorate has not actually
voted on this issue since a proposal was put to the voters on November 9, 1938. See The Ohio
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
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tion have failed, proponents of the change feel that the time is right to
try again. 5 This time the target date for placing the issue on the ballot
is November 3, 1987.
In order to get a constitutional amendment on the ballot, the proponents of the change must gather the signatures of six percent of the
electorate on a petition which demands a referendum.6 If the requisite
number of signatures are gathered, proponents may order the submission of their amendment to the electors of the state for approval or
rejection by ballot. 7 "A shorter and far simpler route [to put a constitutional amendment on the ballot] would be to get both houses of the
Ohio legislature to pass a joint resolution placing the question on the
ballot . . . ." However, with the cynicism aimed at a proposal to include merit selection on the ballot from such people as former Chief
Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court Frank D. Celebrezze, that course is
unlikely.9
The basic premise of this proposed change in the selection of
judges is grounded in the philosophy that an improved judiciary will
result if Ohio abolishes the nomination of judicial candidates by party
primaries and eliminates the competitive character of the general elections of judges.10 Arguments have been made that the elimination of
the competitive character and formal political party participation in judicial selection will result in a substantial net improvement over the
present hybrid system." This substantial net improvement is said to

Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Retention: SJR 23, Pfeifer (ReBucyrus), STATEHOUSE
ACTION, Apr. 1986, at 2, col. I [hereinafter Ohio Merit Plan]. See also supra note 2.

5. Proponents in Ohio include, but are not limited to: the A.B.A., League of Women Voters
of Ohio, Ohio Congress of Ohio Parents and Teachers, Ohio Council of Churches, Common
Cause/Ohio, Women's City Club of Cincinnati, and Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
See Thomas, Voter Retention and Merit Selection Continues to Proceed to a 1987 Vote by the
Citizens of Ohio, 59 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 436, 436 (1986).
6. OHIO CONST. art. 11,§ I(c).
7. Id. See also OHIO CONST. art XVI, § I (Ohio voters must pass the constitutional amendment by a three-fifths majority vote). The number of signatures to place this amendment on the
ballot is in dispute because of differences of opinion in the exact number of registered voters.
Estimates of the number of signatures to place the referendum on the ballot range from 350,000
to 500,000. See Riley, supra note 4, at 7, col. I. See also Merit Selection Plan Statewide Petition
Drive is Underway, 59 OHIO ST. B. REP. 1356 (1986).
8. Riley, supra note 4, at 7, col. I.
9. See id.
10. See Mullinax, Judicial Revision-An Argument Against the Merit Plan for Judicial
Selection and Tenure, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 20 (1973).
I1. Ohio Merit Plan, supra note 4, at 2, col. 2. See generally Report of the Selection of
Judicial Administration, 87 ANN. REP. A.B.A. The committee's comments to § 5, 1of the Draft
of a Model Judicial Article for State Constitutions states that -Ithe importance of removing the
process of judicial nomination from the political arena is probably the most essential element in
Published
by eCommons,
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include both a higher quality of justice and of judges. However,
before endorsing a proposal that calls for a radical change in Ohio's
method of judicial selection, careful consideration must be given to ensure that empirical evidence supports the assertion that a substantial
net improvement will indeed result from a change in the method of
judicial selection. In short, the burden of proof rests heavily upon the
proponents of merit selection if the present system is to be altered.
The proposed change is a variation of the nominative-appointiveelective plan instituted in Missouri in 1940.13 That plan, commonly referred to as the merit plan, Missouri plan, or nonpartisan selection
plan, has several variations, but three characteristics tend to be recurrent in all."' They are:

(1) a permanent, non-partisan commission of lawyers and non-lawyers
chaired by a judge, which independently generates, screens and submits
a list of judicial nominees to fill every vacancy (2) an executive who
(3)
appoints one of these nominees for a probationary period after which
15
the judge runs for election unopposed on a non-partisan ballot.
The implementation of these characteristics is essentially the proposed
change in Ohio." Judges in Ohio are currently elected to six-year
terms through partisan primary elections and nonpartisan general elections. 7 If a vacancy should occur in mid-term, either by death, retirement, or any other reason, the vacancy is filled by an appointment by
the governor, and a successor is elected for the unexpired term at the
18
first general election for the office which is vacant. This method of
19
judicial selection has produced competent, well-qualified judges. One
commentator contends that Ohio's present judiciary is "one of the best
' 20 However, evaluating a judicial sysjudicial systems in the country.
12. See Douglas, Plan Would Lead to Better Judges, The Columbus Dispatch, Mar. 8,
1987, at 3B, col. I.
13. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its Historical Development, in SELECTED READINGS JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 29, 37 (G. Winters rev. ed.
1973).
14. There is no precise definition of merit selection because states differ on the necessary
elements. In this comment, therefore, reference to merit selection refers to the plan as generally
outlined in the text accompanying note 15.
15. Flango & Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST.
Sys. J. 25, 26 (1979)(emphasis original).
16. See supra note 2.
17. OHIO CONST. art. IV § 6. For a more detailed explanation of the present method of
judicial selection in Ohio see generally supra note 1.
18. Id. at art. IV § 13.
19. Telephone interview with Judge George F. Burkhart of Monroe County Court of Common Pleas (Feb. 27, 1987). See also Burkhart, Move to Merit Selection Requires Serious Consideration by Voters, 6 JUD. NOTICE Jan. 1986, at 1-2.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
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tern is difficult, and the opinions of those with vested interests in the
present system cannot be substituted for empirical data. Therefore, further investigation into criteria of judicial evaluation and quality is necessary before praising the present system of judicial selection or endorsing a proposed change.
When structuring an efficient and effective judicial system a paramount concern is to strike the proper balance between the competing
values of democratic accountability2 1 and judicial independence.2 2 On
one hand, judges' decisions have an immediate impact on the public;
thus, judges must be held accountable for their behavior. While on the
other hand, to do their job proficiently judges must remain independent
"from the ebb and flow of public opinion and politics." '23 Hence, the
method of judicial selection that strikes the more democratic balance
between these forces will likely result in a more effective judiciary. Advocates of both the proposed merit plan and the present hybrid method
of judicial selection claim such a balance. Thus, to determine the validity of these claims, both judicial accountability and independence are
examined in each method of judicial selection.

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Merit Selection

1. Accountability
Advocates of the proposed merit selection plan allege that this
method of judicial selection promotes judicial accountability to the
public. According to the merit selection plan, each appointed judge
must participate in a two-year probationary period.24 After the probationary period and at the end of each six-year regular term thereafter,
a judge must participate in a retention election2 5 whereby the electoCelebrezze).
21. Democratic accountability is the degree that a judge can be held accountable to the
public for his behavior on the bench. See Lovrich & Sheldon, Voters in Judicial Elections: An
Attentive Public or An Uninformed Electorate?, 9 JUST. Sys. J. 23, 23 (1984).
22.
Judicial independence is the degree that a judge can remain independent of party platforms or party expectancy. Id. "Since impartiality is a mode of behavior made possible by the
independence of judges, independence becomes the second criterion by which means of judicial
selection should be measured." Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections-NonpartisanPremises with Partisan Results, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 762, 763 (1971).
23. Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 21 at 23.
24. See Liber, 1986-Time of Change, TRIAL, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 4, col. 2 (summarizing
Ohio Senator Paul Pfeifer's proposed amendment to the Ohio Constitution in which the two-year
probationary period is addressed).
25. The proposed retention election ballot for Ohio is worded: "SHOULD (CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE OR JUDGE) (INSERT APPROPRIATE NAME) BE CONTINUED IN OFFICE FOR A FULL TERM AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF HIS CURRENT TERM OF
Published
by eCommons, 1986
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rate has an opportunity to evaluate the judge's progress."
It is argued that "[i]n principle, the public's opportunity to [vote]
in merit retention election [s] of judges is the ultimate check on judicial
accountability. 2 7 This contention is based on the premise that voters
can examine the judge's record and decide whether or not he or she is
doing a suitable job.
Contrary to the opinion of merit selection advocates, most empirical evidence refutes the contention that retention elections are the ultimate check of judicial accountability. An exhaustive analysis of the
Missouri system completed after twenty-five years of operation was
studied in 1974 when Texas proposed a constitutional change in the
selection of judges. 2 The Texas study concluded that "the Missouri
Plan destroys judicial accountability to the electorate, and the judiciary
'2 9
risks losing its credibility with the people." Similarly, a study exploring voter interest and participation, using both national data and a case
study of the 1978 retention elections in Wyoming, revealed that a
prominent characteristic of retention elections was increased voter abstention or lack of participation." That study also revealed that voter
31
apathy was exacerbated by merit selection. In yet another study, it
was found that among states using merit retention elections between
1948 and 1974 the rate of voter participation was markedly lower than
32
that of states employing partisan and nonpartisan elections of judges.
The end result of these data is evident. The empirical evidence
indisputably leads to the conclusion that merit selection decreases voter
participation. With decreased voter participation there is sure to be decreased judicial accountability.
The purpose of retention elections is undoubtedly to maintain some
semblance of responsiveness and public accountability for the judici-

See Liber, supra note 24. See also Frank, Choosing Judges: Time for a Change?, BAR
Mar.-Apr., at 4, col. 2.
27. Griffin & Horan, Judicial Merit Retention in Wyoming: An Analysis and Some Suggestions for Reform, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 567, 569 (1980). See also Lovrich & Sheldon,
supra note 21.
28. The analysis was performed by a team from the University of Missouri. See Watson,
Downing & Speigel, Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests,
61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 54 (1967). See also Mullinax, supra note 10, at 20.
29. Mullinax, supra note 10, at 33-34. The study reaches this conclusion by establishing
that retention elections are simply a deceptive means to convince the electorate that the democratic process is being honored by the judiciary. Id. at 33.
30. Griffin & Horan, Merit Retention Elections: What Influences Voters?, 63 JUDICATURE
78, 88 (1979)
31. Id.
32. Id. at 82. See also Dubois, Voter Turnout in State Judicial Elections: An Analysis of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
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ary. s3 But a persuasive argument may be made that retention elections
simply serve a cosmetic purpose, one that does not genuinely satisfy the
goal of public accountability.3 4 "Political analysts would agree that the
end result of these well-intentioned reforms of judicial elections has
been . . . a significant decline in voter participation in judicial elections
... "3 Support for this contention lies in the several studies which
conclude noncompetitive, nonpartisan retention elections simply generate less participation and voter interest than contested judicial elections.3 6 In addition, it is undisputed that where there is a greater potential for voter interest and participation, there is also greater potential
for accountability.3 7 Therefore, retention elections which purport to
spur responsiveness and public accountability, while maintaining independence, do not fulfill all of these objectives.
The available data suggests that the implementation of merit selection results in a sharp decline in voter participation." "While the
notion of holding judges accountable to the people through the electoral
process expresses our conviction that even the operations and policies of
the judicial branch of government are fundamentally subject to democratic political principles,"3 9 merit selection works against this conviction because it creates a decline in voter participation. 0 In short, the
adoption of merit selection in Ohio could inevitably result in increased
voter apathy, decreased voter participation, and decreased judicial
accountability.
2.

Independence

Proponents of judicial selection on the basis of merit may stand on
firmer ground when they suggest judicial independence is advanced by
merit selection. The empirical evidence substantiates that the imple33. Comment, Selecting Michigan's Supreme Court Justices: Enough of Partisan Non-Partisan Elections?, 1984 DET. C.L. REV. 731, 750.
34. Id. at 749.
35. Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 24.
36. An analysis of several studies is included in P. DuBols, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH
(1980); and R. WATSON, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR (1969).
37. Comment, supra note 33, at 750.
38. Yet another study examining voter turnout in elections held for justices of state courts
of last resort, utilizing various types of ballots, found a wide disparity in mean voter turnout
between partisan ballot, nonpartian ballot, and merit retention ballot. P. DuBols, supra note 36, at
46.
39. Griffin & Horan, supra note 30, at 88.
40. Dubois presented a study demonstrating that the implementation of merit selection
reduces voter participation. That study is presented below. Ohio, of course, does not have a partisan judicial ballot; further, this study focuses solely on the consequences of switching from a
partisan judicial ballot to a nonpartisan rutention election. It is significant, however, in that it
underscore.; the strong correlation between decreased voter participation and implementation of
merit selection.

Published by eCommons, 1986
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mentation of merit selection decreases judicial accountability, 4 ' and increased judicial independence follows from the decreased accountability. 42 A caveat is necessary at this point: Too much or too little of
43
either judicial independence or accountability is not desirable.
These antithetical forces of accountability and independence pro44
duce a state of tension between judicial conduct and political reality.
Since both accountability and independence are essential in a democratic system, logic suggests that an appropriate balance will result in
the most efficient method of judicial selection. It is rarely disputed, in
fact, that an appropriate balance between these antithetical forces produces an efficient judiciary.45
The Effect of Ballot Form Upon Voter Participation
Mean Participation Differentials in Four States
Switching From Partisan to Merit Retention Ballots
Percent
Difference

Percent
Partisan Ballots

Percent
Retention Ballots

Colorado

92.2

66.2

-26.0

Indiana

97.0

45.6

-51.4

Iowa

90.0

46.2

-43.8

Kansas

87.2

67.2

-20.0

Colorado

93.1

61.3

-31.8

Indiana

97.8

40.8

-57.0

Iowa

83.6

40.8

-42.8

Kansas

89.9

66.9

-23.0

State
Presidential Years

Mid-Term Years

The merit retention ballot was first used in Colorado in 1968, in Indiana in 1972, in Iowa in
1964, and in Kansas in 1960. Dubois, supra note 32, at 876.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 24-40.
42. See Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing the importance of striking an
appropriate balance between accountability and independence).
43. See Barber, supra note 22, at 762; Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 23.
44. Judges are sworn to remain independent from political influence in the courtroom. However, while on the bench, judges shape and develop the law and allocate societal values such as life
and liberty. They are, in other words, making policy. Barber, supra note 22.
A political reality is that policy makers in a democracy should be accountable to the people
they rule. Inherent in any elected branch of government is politicking. Thus, although judges
should be free from political influence, the reality is that politics influence the selection of judges
under any type of election, general, retention or otherwise.
45. Logic supports the notion that a balance is necessary. If judges have no accountability
to the public for their behavior, they could make decisions in court depending on their moods. If
they have no independence they could be catering to the whims of the electorate. Thus, there is

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
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"Since impartiality is a mode of behavior made possible by the
independence of judges,"' 46 proponents of merit selection contend that
increased judicial independence solves a host of problems associated
with popular elections. These problems include "the increased politicalization of the bench as a result of increasing electoral competition. 4' 7
A popular complaint of increased politicalization is that the judiciary is
no place for bitterly fought political battles.4 8 Naturally, proponents of
merit selection express concern about judges owing their positions to
the political machines that help them onto the bench. 49 Proponents argue that all too often political coalitions are instrumental in successful
judicial campaigns. Since politics has infiltrated the judiciary, proponents conclude that serious questions can be raised about a judge's ability to maintain independence and impartiality."
Other conventional arguments in the context of favoring the adoption of merit selection "concern themselves with the inconvenience[s]
inherent in the popular election process." 51 These inconveniences include the "[p]hysical effort of campaigning, candidate's time consumed
in a political race, campaign expenses, and [the] general indignities of
direct exposure to the voting public." 52 Reacting to these inconveniences, advocates of merit selection point to history to demonstrate
that campaign spending and competition are on an uncontrollable skyward journey.5 3 The advocates' ultimate conclusion is that these increases will undoubtedly lead to elevated "concern about conflicts of
interest and judges' ability to decide cases solely on their merits."'54
Without increased independence, these deficiencies, it is argued, will
undoubtedly result in a less effective judiciary. 55
Despite legitimate concern, empirical evidence demonstrates that
the adoption of merit selection neither removes politics from the judiciary nor results in a more trustworthy judiciary.5 6 Perhaps the most frequently cited reason to adopt merit selection is that its increased inde-

little dispute that the most effective judiciary results form a balance between accountability and
independence. See Lovrich & Sheldon supra note 21; see also Barber, supra note 22.
46. Barber, supra note 22, at 763.
47. Zelman, A Merit Selection System for California, CAL. ST. B.J. 420, 420 (1980).
48. Comment, supra note 33, at 744.
49. Id.
50. Id.
5I. Burnett, Observations on the Direct-Election Method of JudicialSelection, 44 TEx. L.
REV. 1098, 1100 (1966).
52. Id.
53. Zelman, supra note 47, at 420.
54. Id.
55. See Garwood, Judicial Revision-An Argument for the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection, 5 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1973).
Published56.
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pendence removes politics from the judiciary.5 7 In fact, a study
examining the merits and demerits of the Missouri Plan during the
course of the 1940 election, its resubmission to the people of Missouri
in 1942, and the debates in the Missouri Constitutional Convention of
1943-44, concluded that the effect of merit selection is not to remove
the courts from politics, but "to drive what politics exist underground." 58 Similarly, an extensive study that focuses on the operation
of the nonpartisan court plan in Missouri, variations of which have
been instituted in a majority of the states recently, 5 9 shows that the

See Peltason, Merits and Demerits of the Missouri Court Plan, in SELECTED READINGS
95 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973); Winters, supra note 13.
58. Peltason, supra note 57, at 103.
59. Ohio's proposed change concerns only its Supreme and appellate courts. Therefore, a
list of the state courts of last resort which utilize some form of merit selection (see generally
supra note 15 and accompanying text) or a nominative appointive procedure to place judges on
the bench is presented below. The applicable constitutional and statutory provisions are also
presented. Several states, however, do not utilize merit selection for initial selection of judges but
they do utilize some form of merit selection or a nominative appointive procedure for filling interim vacancies. Therefore, those states are included in the "majority of the states" currently
utilizing merit selection.
States that utilize merit selection in their courts of last resort for interim vacancies include:
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Wyoming. See Flango & Ducat, supra note 15, at 29.
States that utilize merit selection in their courts of last resort for initial selection include:
ALASKA CONST. art. IV § 5 (governor fills vacancies in supreme or superior courts by appointing
persons nominated by judicial council); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 36-38 (nonpartisan commission
with appointment by governor); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (appointed by governor and confirmed
by commission); COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 20, 24-26 (appointment by governor from a list of
nominees provided by nonpartisan commission); CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (nominated by governor
and appointed by general assembly); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (appointed by governor with consent of majority of all members elected to Senate); FLA. CONST. art. V § 20 (judicial nominating
commission submits names of candidates approved by governor); HAWAII CONST. art. V, § 3 (governor nominates, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, justices are appointed by
Senate); IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 3, 5, 11 (selected by judicial nominating commission and appointed by governor); IOWA CONST. art. V, §§ 15-17 (appointed by governor from a list of nominees submitted by judicial nominating commission); KAN. CONST. art. Ii, § 2 (appointment by
the governor of one of three nominees submitted by a nominating commission, the Supreme Court
only); ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1,§ 8 (appointed by governor with advice and consent of seven
member body elected by general assembly); MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A (appointed by governor
with advice and consent of Senate); MASS. CONST. art. IX, pt. 2, § I, cl.2 (nominated and appointed by governor with advice and consent of eight member body); Mo. CONST. art. V §§
29(c)(1), 29(c)(2)(d) (nonpartisan judicial commission nominates and submits names to governor
for appointment); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 (list of at least two nominees presented to governor by
judicial nominating commission for appointment); N.H. CONST. art. XLVI, pt. 2 (power of nomination of judge is granted exclusively to governor and the power of appointment granted exclusively to council); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, pt. I (governor nominates and appoints with the advice
and consent of the Senate); OKLA. CONST. art. VIIB, §§ 1-3 (appointed under Missouri plan by
governor); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (governor appoints from one or more persons nominated by a
judicial qualification commission); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (governor fills vacancy from a list
of at least three nominees certified to governor by a judicial nominating commission); VT. CONST.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
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plan has not eliminated political forces from the selection of judges.6 0
On the contrary, that study found:
[T]he Plan has not eliminated "politics" as the term is used in its
broadest sense, that is, the maneuvering of individuals and groups to influence who will be chosen as judges. Rather, it has changed the nature
of that politics to include not only partisan forces but also those relating
to the interests of the organized Bar, the judiciary, and the court's "attentive publics."' 6
These studies conclude that rather than removing politics from the judiciary, merit selection merely camouflages reality from the less attentive electorate.
Other studies have also indicated that the increased independence
of merit selection does little in the way of diminishing politics in the
judiciary. For example, an early study found that appellate judges were
influenced by party affiliation in their decisions regardless of whether
their selection was by appointment, nonpartisan ballot, or popular election. 62 Likewise, a more recent study involving "nearly 5000 state appeals court decisions in all fifty states found no statistically significant
relationship between selection method and the success of various types
of appellants. ' 63 The data collectively suggests that politics is part of
our democratic society, and regardless of the method of judicial selection utilized, politics will exercise an important influence.
Although proponents of merit selection suggest that increased independence will diminish the political involvement in judicial elections,
the empirical evidence appears to be to the contrary. The true effect of
merit selection on politics in the judiciary is likely to be an increase in
the "secret, backroom type" of politics. 64 As United States Senator
James A. Reed6 contended: "One is very naive, very ignorant, who
ing body); WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4 (appointed by governor from a list of three nominees submitted by judicial nominating commission).
States that have statutory provisions covering merit selection for the judicial selection of the
courts of last resort include: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-40, 2-42, 2-43 (Supp 1986); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 602-2, 602-51 (Supp. 1984)); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-2.1-.6 (West 1983); see also
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 46.14-15, 46.20-.21 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-111 (1986);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 11-109 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 16-11, 16-1-2, 16-1-2.2
(Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-7.1-.3, 20-1-7.6-.7 (Supp. 1986); VT.STAT. ANN. tit. 4
§§ 601-603 (Supp. 1986);
60. R. WATSON, supra note 36, at 352.
61. Id.
62. See Nagel, PoliticalParty Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 843
(1961).
63. Drechsel, Judicial Selection and Trial Judge-JournalistInteraction in Two States, 10
JUST. SYS. J.6, 8 (1985).
64. Peltason, supra note 57, at 102.
65. Senator Reed served as a United States Senator from Missouri from 1911 until 1929.
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does not know that Governors always have been and always will be
influenced by political and selfish considerations in making appointments." 6 Furthermore, nothing prevents the governor, working within
a merit selection plan, from making a selection based on partisanship,
nor is the panel which selects potential candidates prohibited from doing the same. 67 Thus, if proponents of merit selection sincerely maintain that partisan politics in the judiciary is undesirable, they should
object all the more strenuously to their system which conceals
partisanship. 68
The judiciary does, however, benefit in some less significant ways
from increased independence. The aforementioned inconveniences inherent in the popular election process are no longer significant. Because
merit selection increases voter apathy and decreases participation and
interest, few judges lose their seats in retention elections.6 9 The net result of this nearly perfect guarantee of life tenure is that the pressures
and expense of an election are virtually eliminated. However, the recentty defeated Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, Frank D.
Celebrezze, contended: "It seems to me that [the growing expense of
judicial campaigns is] a poor reason to get people to give up their right
to vote."170 Relief from the pressures and expense of a general election
seems to be an insufficient rationale to support the contention that the
increased judicial independence from merit selection will significantly
enhance Ohio's judiciary. There is no assurance that the removal of the
inconvenience and sacrifice associated with popular general elections
suggests a dramatic improvement in the judiciary. 7 1 In fact, the empirical evidence suggests there will be no significant change in the quality
72
of the judiciary.
B.

Hybrid

1. Accountability
Ohio's present method of judicial selection does not provide an
overabundance of judicial accountability. In order to hold judges accountable for their behavior on the bench, the electorate must be able
to make a reasoned and well-informed evaluation of a judge's performance. "In partisan elections, it has been shown that the dominant

66.

Peltason, supra note 57, at 102 (quoting St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 18, 1943, at 1,

col. I).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Comment, supra note 33, at 745.
Id. at 746.
Winters, supra note 13, at 33.
Riley, supra note 4, at 7, cot. 3.
Burnett, supra note 51, at 1098.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-71.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10

19861

COMMENT

source of information for voters regarding judicial candidates is the
party endorsement; this informational source is followed by conversations with friends, the media, and bar association recommendations." 7 3
Because Ohio's general elections of the judiciary are nonpartisan, the
main source of voter information, the party endorsement, is not available."' The explanation for the lack of party endorsement in the present
hybrid system is quite simple. When judicial reform created these hybrid systems of partisan primaries and nonpartisan general elections,
the intent was most likely "to free voters to give more sober and
thoughtful consideration to the qualifications and qualities of the com7 5
peting candidates.
In principle, the present hybrid method of judicial selection allows
the preelection process to educate the electorate concerning a candidate's partisan affiliation. However, in practice, "the low visibility of
judicial contests has meant that the partisanship of the preelection process does not penetrated to the electorate, leaving voters to call upon
alternative non party voting cues" 76 often with voters abandoning their
traditional partisan allegiances. Proponents of merit selection support
this depoliticalization of the judiciary contending that "judges should
be above popular clamor. 17 7 However, "[ilt is widely suggested that
[due to the decrease in partisan affiliation] democratic accountability
has lost the upper hand in its struggle with judicial independence...
and that the average voter has been reduced to the position of an
78
unknowledgeable participant in a largely symbolic process."1
A recent study in Oregon exemplifies the problems associated with
a decrease of partisan affiliation in judicial selection. 79 Oregon, inan

73. Griffin & Horan, supra note 27, at 568.
74. Given the low stimulus nature of judicial elections, it is not surprising that many voters
do not retain much information from the partisan primaries held in Ohio's hybrid system. Accordingly, voters must look for alternative voting cues other than partisanship to guide their voting in
the general election. "Two such guides available to the voter are incumbency and name recognition." P. DuBols, supra note 36, at 80.
Though incumbency and name recognition have often encouraged Ohio voters to abandon
their traditional partisan allegiances in casting their votes in the judicial elections, [many]
examples also suggest that a name strongly associated with [Ohio's] partisan politics can
invoke a partisan response from the voters despite the nonpartisan ballot. The name of Taft
for example, which is virtually synonymous with the Ohio Republican party, invariably
produces a partisan electoral response.
Id. 82-83. However, some argue that races for the Supreme Court of Ohio have a fairly strong
.,partisan tinge" because party organizers are actively involved in primary campaign publicity. See
Baum, supra note 1.
75. See Dubois, supra note 36, at 79.
76. Id. at 81.
77. Peltason, supra note 57, at 98.
78. Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 24.
79. Id. at 23.
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effort to secure the appropriate balance between the competing values
of democratic accountability and judicial independence in judicial selection, reformed its selection method by instituting nonpartisan judicial elections on separate judicial ballots. 80 Although this reform was
intended "to remove judges from partisan politics while retaining a direct electoral link with the public," 8' its result was quite the contrary.
In fact, the net result of the Oregon experience is in accord with what
political analysts say has resulted from a reduction in partisan politics
in the judiciary:
(1) a significant decline in voter participation in judicial elections
(2) the substitution of incumbency, name familiarity, ethnicity, and gender for the party label as major voting cues . . . (3) a preponderance of
uncontested races . . . and most importantly, (4) a paucity of public information on and 8 2limited citizen knowledge concerning judicial candidates and courts."
Additionally, the removal of the party label from a general election
cuts the candidates off "from the two major parties and their political
resources, such as party rallies, the aid of some party organizations,
and the crucial partisan identity so familiar to the electorate. 8 3
Nevertheless, proponents of merit selection contend that the removal of political influences from the judiciary improves the quality
and impartiality of justices. In reality, the result of merely removing
party endorsements from the ballot in judicial elections has been to
burden and discourage the participation of the electorate.8 ' Furthermore, in comparison with a partisan judicial election, the competitive
character of nonpartisan general elections is markedly decreased.8 5
Voter participation and competition in judicial elections are perhaps the two most important variables in evaluating judicial accountability. If a judge is to be held accountable for his behavior, the electorate must be interested in matters applicable to the judiciary and must
voice that interest on their ballots by endorsing the incumbent or a

80. Id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id. (citations omitted). See also Adamany & Dubois, The Forgetful Voters and an
Unreported Vote, 39 PUB. OPINION Q. 277 (1975); Dubois, supra note 32, at 865; Hannah, Competition in Michigan's Judicial Elections: Democratic Ideals vs. Judicial Realities, 24 WAYNE L.
REv. 1267 (1978); Johnson, Staefer & McKnight, The Salience of Judicial Candidates and Elections, 59 Soc. Sci. Q 372 (1978).
83. Lovrich & Sheldon, supra note 21, at 24.
84. "[A] nonpartian ballot discourages voter participation, both because nonpartisan judicial races are less frequently contested and because in a low-salience contest many voters will
refrain from voting without a party label to help them cast their ballots." P. Dunois, supra note
36, at 144.
85. Id.
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more qualified candidate. In Ohio, the present hybrid system results in
limited voter interest and participation."8 However, the proposed merit
selection plan would eliminate competition and further reduce both
voter interest and participation. 87 Thus, if judicial accountability is to
be preserved in Ohio, the proposed merit selection plan should not be
implemented.
2.

Independence

When compared to the proposed merit selection system of judicial
selection, Ohio's present hybrid system results in considerably less judicial independence. The hypothesis that "the effect of merit selection is
to perpetuate the present judges in office for the balance of their
lives" 8 8 is well documented. For example, a 1978 Wyoming study of
judicial retention elections concluded that it was unlikely for a judge to
lose his seat in a retention election in that state.8 9 These data are characteristic of the results of merit retention elections of trial court judges
across the nation.9" In 1978 for instance, 408 retention elections of trial
court judges were held, and only twelve of the judges (2.9%) were not
retained in the thirteen states where such elections were held. 91 Although Ohio's proposed change does not include trial court judges,
these results are typical of all retention elections. For example, several
studies before 1978 indicate that defeats at retention election polls
amount to "statistical rarities."9 In particular, "[a]n analysis of 1976
election data from thirteen states found that 350 of 353 judges [(over
99%)] standing for retention were approved by the electorate, often by
lopsided majorities." 9 3 Furthermore, "[i]n the [eleven] states which
held retention elections in 1972, 308 judges ran 'on their records,' but
' The conclusion
only four were rejected." 94
which one arrives at in view
of these data is clear-merit retention elections have long operated to
the decided advantage of incumbent judges.
These data lend strong support to those who endorse the contention that merit retention elections are "nothing more than windowdressing, a facade for maintaining popular accountability of judicial of-

86. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
88. Peltason, supra note 57, at 101.
89. Griffin & Horan, supra note 27 (Wyoming study of judicial selection).
90. Griffin & Horan, supra note 30 at 81.
91.
Id.
92. Id. at 79.
93. Id. (footnote omitted). See also Jenkins, Retention Elections: Who Wins When No One
Loses?, 61 JUDICATURE 79, 80 (1977).
94. Griffin & Horan, supra note 30, at 79 (footnote omitted). See also, Merit Retention
Published
by in
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ficers by a means of a plebiscite whose favorable outcome is assured in
advance." 95 The empirical evidence seems to imply that merit selection
almost guarantees life tenure, which in turn suggests an extremely high
level of judicial independence.
On the whole, if judicial selection "methods were limited to methods that require competitive elections and methods that do not,"9 " the
empirical evidence suggests that judges who must compete for their
seats are more likely to see a need to communicate with the public to
retain their seats. 97 Increased communication with the public resulting
from competitive election campaigns leads to greater accountability
and less independence.
A common assumption involving the Ohio judiciary "is that the
'normal' means of access to the bench is gubernatorial appointment to
fill an unexpired term, followed by election which is virtually automatic
due to the appointee's advantage of incumbency." 9' 8 If this assumption
were true, the present system would have little advantage over the proposed merit selection system in the way of judicial accountability or
independence. Furthermore, life tenure would be virtually guaranteed.
This assumption, however, is far from the truth. From 1852
through 1970, only 19.9% of the accessions to the Ohio Supreme Court
were by appointment. 9 Of the appointees who stood for election, a majority were defeated by the voters. 100 These data can be appreciated
best when compared with a similar study in Missouri, the first state in
which the merit plan was officially adopted. "In Missouri, where retention elections are used for some judges while others must run for office
on partisan ballots, only one judge in almost 40 years has ever failed to
be retained. Yet, in 1976 alone, six incumbent circuit judges running
on partisan ballots were defeated for re-election.' 10 1
Two findings from these studies are especially noteworthy. First,
although voter interest and participation is relatively low in Ohio, a
judge is not completely independent once he has ascended to the bench

95. Griffin & Horan, supra note 27, at 582 (footnote omitted). See also Wormuth & Rich,
Politics, the Bar and Selection of Judges, 3 UTAH L. REV. 459 (1953) (compares merit selection
and nonpartisan elections).
96. Id. at 460.
97. Drechsel, supra note 63, at 8.
98. Barber, supra note 22, at 768 (footnote omitted). See also Henderson, Appointment as
a Means of Initial Accession to Elective State Courts of Last Resort, 38 N. DAK. L. REV. 60, 67
(1962).
99. Barber, supra note 22, at 769. "This percentage measures 38 of the total 191 accessions.
Tabulated from Ohio Secretary of State, Official Roster of Federal, State, County Officers 106-12
(1970); T. Brown, Secretary of State, Ohio Election Statistics 1969-70, 133 (1971)." Id. at 769
n.30.
100. Barber, supra note 22 at 769.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/10
101. Griffin & Horan, supra note 30, at 79 (footnote omitted).
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by gubernatorial appointment. Second, partisan elections ensure that
the judicial branch is fundamentally subject to the checks and balances
of democratic political principles, and merit selection does not. For example, a Missouri judge facing retention election has nearly a guaranteed life tenure and an extremely high level of independence. While a
Missouri judge facing partisan election is not a guaranteed life tenure,
and his independence is greatly reduced. The comparison underscores
the importance of a competitive popular election.
At this point a curious query arises: Does the method of judicial
selection really have a significant impact on the balance of judicial independence and judicial accountability? The studies suggest the real
value of a judicial election is to raise judicial accountability and lower
independence. Although the correlation is apparent, further research in
this area is necessary.
C. Merit Selection Versus Hybrid System
To recapitulate, the purpose of examining both the present hybrid
method of judicial selection and the proposed merit selection plan, in
light of judicial accountability and judicial independence, is to determine which system will be the most beneficial to the people of Ohio.
Perhaps it is easier to visualize these antithetical forces on a continuum. At one end is complete judicial independence and zero judicial
accountability, and at the other end is complete accountability and zero
independence.
Proponents of merit selection suggest that their method of judicial
selection strikes a fair balance between the two. Support for that contention is: (1) A retention election is the ultimate in accountability, and
(2) the appointment procedure limits the political influence on the judiciary. Proponents of the merit selection conclude that removing politics
from the judicial branch will result in ultimate independence whereby
judges will be relieved of potential conflicts of interest in order to decide cases solely on the merits. Empirical evidence demonstrates these
assertions are exaggerated or unfounded. In fact, keeping with the continuum example, the evidence undoubtedly places merit selection far to
one side of the scale, that is, dangerously close to complete independence and zero accountability.
Of course, it might be said that judges selected through the present hybrid judicial selection plan in Ohio are not independent, since
their selection depends on popular choice; nor are judges in Ohio accountable, since their selection method uses a nonpartisan election system which indicates many voters use nonpartisan voting cues to make
their final selections. However, this criticism of Ohio's present method
of judicial selection itself suggests that the hybrid system is in accord
with by
the
recurring1986
objective of this analysis-striking an appropriate
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balance between the antithetical forces of accountability and independence. In addition, the empirical evidence places the hybrid system at a
more acceptable point on the hypothetical continuum scale, somewhere
closer to the middle. It was, of course, the purpose of this evaluation to
determine which method of judicial selection arrived at a more acceptable balance between judicial independence and accountability. It must
be concluded that the present hybrid system achieves the sought after
balance. Therefore, Ohio's current system of judicial selection should
be retained.
IV.

JUDICIAL EVALUATION

Even in the wake of empirical evidence demonstrating that Ohio's
present hybrid system strikes a more appropriate balance between accountability and independence, proponents of the merit selection system
still contend that merit selection improves the quality of the judiciary.
A qualified judiciary is undoubtedly important; therefore, it is imperative to determine whether this claim has validity.
Commentators have proposed several judicial "qualifications" that
are said to gauge the capacity of prospective justices. 0 2 These qualifications include education, localism, and prior experience. But studies
comparing qualification indicators and subsequent decisions of particular judges have shown that there is no meaningful relationship between
different judges' decision making behavior and indicators of
qualification. 0 3
One study evaluating the quality of judges relied upon different
sources of advice for screening judicial prospects. "[T]he focus [of this
study was] upon the 658 judges appointed to sit on California's major
trial court, the Superior Court, from 1959 through 1977 by three governors: Edmund G. 'Pat' Brown, Sr. (1959-1966), Ronald Reagan
(1967-1974), and Edmund G. 'Jerry' Brown, Jr. (1975-1982)."104 This
study, which examined judicial qualities important to a governor for
the purpose of appointing nominees, concluded "[d]ifferent gubernatorial administrations open up distinct paths of access to the bench."' 0 5
In particular, this study found:
Edmund G. Brown, Sr. judged candidates' potential for "judicial temperament," legal and academic background, professional reputation, involvement in the community, and experience in public positions. Governor Reagan's Judicial Selection Advisory Boards were advised to

Comment, supra note 33, at 747.
Id. at 748.
Dubois, State Trial Court Appointments: Does the Governor Make a Difference?, 69
JUDICATURE 20 (1985).
105. Id. at 28.
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evaluate candidates' "personal integrity, temperament, legal ability and
experience, stature and reputation in the community, and capacity for
work." Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.'s administration claimed to seek
individuals "who are very intelligent, who are experienced in courts, who
have a judicious temperament, who have commitment to hard work, who
will bring some imagination to the job . .

.

.

In addition, this study also concluded that "[aippointees were . . . de

facto required to share the governor's party affiliation and to be located
on the same side of the ideological spectrum as the governor. "107
The California study demonstrates that there is little consistency
or objectivity in the qualities necessary to perform well on the bench.
While studies show that particular qualifications of a judge do not influence his decision making, or that different governors search for different qualities in nominating a judge, there is no conclusive data to
suggest any particular characteristics improve the "quality" of a judge.
Because the variety of judicial selection methods employ different criteria to evaluate judicial competence, ability, or potential, it is premature
to conclude that any method of judicial selection produces higher quality judges. The indicators used in evaluating judges are, at best, imperfect. Therefore, the proponents' claim that merit selection produces a
higher quality judiciary is unfounded.
V.

CONCLUSION

The proposed merit selection of supreme and appellate court
judges calls for a radical change in the means of selecting Ohio's judiciary. Empirical evidence demonstrates that merit selection will result
in decreased democratic accountability and increased judicial independence. The net result of these changes is likely to be reduced voter
participation and interest in Ohio's judicial elections. The benefits of
the plan seem to be minimal. It is argued that as a result of the change,
the inconveniences associated with popular elections (cost and
campaigning) will be greatly reduced. The people of Ohio, however,
should not relinquish their right to vote in order to avoid the inconveniences of a democracy.
Proponents of the merit plan contend that there are many other
benefits associated with the plan. They contend that political involvement in the judiciary will decrease and the quality of judges will increase. The empirical evidence refutes these claims. In fact, studies
have shown that politics in the judiciary will not diminish, but rather
will be of the insidious backroom type. Furthermore, measuring the

106.
107.

Id.
See Flango & Ducat, supra note 15, at 33-34.
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qualities of a judge is not a simple task with agreed upon standards.
Therefore, it is difficult to express anything more than an opinion about
the essential qualities of a "good" judge.
In summation, there is no empirical evidence to show deficiencies
in the quality of the elected judges under Ohio's hybrid system of judicial selection. Furthermore, the present system strikes a more democratic balance between the antithetical forces of accountability and independence than does the merit selection. If Ohio is interested in
improving its judiciary, perhaps an educational program to properly educate the electorate on the record and background of the candidates
would be most beneficial. That would most likely spur voter interest
and participation and fill the void associated with nonpartisan elections.
In brief, proponents of merit selection have not met their burden of
proof that merit selection will benefit Ohio's judiciary; therefore, the
current system should be retained.
Brian Cyril Salvagni
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